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RECENT DECISIONS
The Pledge of Allegiaiice
aiid the First Amendment
The recent addition of the phrase "under
God" to the flag salute as presented in the
public schools of New York State has pro-
voked an unsuccessful constitutional chal-
lenge.
In the case of Lewis v. Allen,' the peti-
tioners brought a proceeding under Article
78 of the New York Civil Practice Act 2 to
compel the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion to remove the phrase "under God"
from the pledge of allegiance to the flag
which the Commissioner had prepared for
use in the public schools pursuant to section
802 of the New York Education Law.: The
petitioners contended that the use of the
phrase "under God" violated both the state
and federal constitutions. The New York
State Supreme Court4 held that the pledge
as prepared by the Commissioner did not
violate the first amendment of the United
States Constitution because there was no
compulsion binding the student to recite
the pledge.
Written references to God in official and
semi-official utterances are fairly common.
Most of the state constitutions have a pre-
amble invoking the name of God. Typical
of these is the preamble to the New York
State Constitution, reading: "We, the peo-
1 5 M.2d 68, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
2 The statutory proceeding against a body or of-
fice which abolished the classifications, writs and
orders of certiorari to review, mandamus and
prohibition.
3N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 802: "It shall be the duty of
the commissioner of education to prepare, for the
use of the public schools of the state, a program
providing for a salute to the flag .. "
4 Primarily a trial court with limited appellate
jurisdiction.
pie of the state of New York grateful to
almighty God for our freedom, in order to
secure its blessings, do establish this consti-
tution." Proclamations of days of thanks-
giving generally contain references to God,'
and "In God We Trust" has been on our
coins since 1864. 6 These various references
have provoked little legal action., of any
consequence.
However, there has been extensive legal
action where references to, or recognition
of, God take on an active character and
require positive action by individuals. Oaths
used in courts frequently make reference to
God.7 Nevertheless in recognition of those
who have no religious belief, most states
have enacted statutes requiring, not an oath,
but an affirmation which makes no reference
to a deity.8 While under the common law
no person could qualify as a witness in a
judicial proceeding unless he believed in a
Supreme Being and in a future life of re-
wards and punishments,!' this requirement
has been abolished by statute or constitu-
tional provision in most states.' 0
Although previous to 1954 the pledge of
allegience did not contain the phrase "under
God,"" the constitutionality of compulsory
'See, e.g., Exec. Proc. No. 2651, 10 FED. REG.
5169 (1945).
6 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 221 (1957).
7 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 361; CAL. CODE
CIv. PROC. ANN. § 2094 (West 1956); ILL. ANN.
STAT. C. 101, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
S See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 362; ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 101. § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1935); MINN.
STAT. ANN. c. 595, § 595.05 (1947); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. C. 516, § 20 (1955).
0 Marshall v. State, 219 Ala. 83, 121 So. 72, 75
(1929).
10 The common-law ruling still remains in Dela-
ware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, and South Carolina.
11 68 STAT. 249, 36 U.S.C.A. § 172 (Supp. 1954).
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flag salutes was frequently litigated in the
state courts in the late 1930's.'2 These dis-
putes involved members of a religious sect
known as Jehovah's Witnesses. They be-
lieved that by saluting the flag and pledging
allegiance to it that they were ascribing sal-
vation to the flag or the government it rep-
resents, forms of worship forbidden by God
as revealed in the Holy Bible13 and punish-
able by eternal destruction. This religious
sect found no relief in the state courts be-
cause the courts uniformly held that requir-
ing a child to salute the flag where the child
objected on religious grounds was not a
violation of the religious freedom guaran-
teed by the first amendment or the various
state constitutions.1 4
The United States Supreme Court at first
took a similar position in Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis,'5 decided in 1940. In 1943,
however, in Board of Educ. v. Barnette,";
it expressly overruled its prior decision and
held that to compel a child to salute the flag
when an objection was made on religious
grounds was a violation of the first amend-
ment. It would therefore appear that al-
though the state may require the flag salute,
its coercion of a person who on religious
grounds refuses to salute, would constitute
an unconstitutional infringement of religious
liberty.
Following the reasoning of the Barnette
12 People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 167 Misc.
436, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 1006 (Co. Ct. 1938), rev'd on
other grounds, 279 N.Y. 523, 18 N.E. 2d 840
(1939): Leoles v. Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192
SE. 218, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 656 (1937):
Nicholls v. Mayor, 297 Mass. 65, 7 N.E. 2d 577
(1937); Hering v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J.L. 455.
189 Atl. 629. appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 624
(1937).
13 "Thou shalt have no other gods before me."
Exodus 20:3.
14 See note 13 supra.
15 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
16 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
case, the Court in the instant case found
in favor of the Commissioner of Education.
The Court stated that since there exists no
force binding the student to recite either the
pledge or the phrase, "under God," the
present pledge of allegiance would not be
said to violate the first amendment. Thus,
the Court failed to rule on the underlying
issue in the case: whether a compulsory oral
reference to God in public schools is valid.
Moral Obligation in
Negligence Cases
After forty-three years, the New York
Court of Appeals has finally erased the
last vestiges of the "charitable immunity"
doctrine from its state law by ending the
immunity of hospitals from liability for cer-
tain torts of their employees. In Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital,1
in 1914, the court had classified doctors
and nurses as independent contractors, and,
as such, solely liable for torts which were of
a professional rather than a ministerial
nature. Since then, the Schloendorfl rule
has been altered,2 questioned, 3 and, finally,
overruled by the recent case of Bing v.
Thunig.4 While this decision makes it in-
advisable to review the cases leading to the
overruling of "charitable immunity," it is
1 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
2 Although the original rule was based on the
status of physicians and nurses as independent con-
tractors, subsequent decisions disregarded the skill
or professional status of the negligent actor and
examined the character of the negligent act. In
Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y.
188. 146 N.E. 199 (1924). an orderly who negli-
gently applied a hot water bottle was held to have
been performing a medical act, for which the
hospital was not liable.
3 See Becker v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 226.
233, 140 N.E.2d 262, 266-67 (1957); Berg v.
New York Soc'y for Relief of the Ruptured and
Crippled. I N.Y,2d 499, 502-03. 136 N.E.2d 523.
524 (1956).
4 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
interesting to note the language which the
same court used only five months earlier in
Becker v. City of New York5 which fore-
shadowed the Bing decision.
In that case the city was sued under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for the in-
juries sustained as a result of the alleged
negligence of a nurse employed by a muni-
cipal hospital. Although under the Schloen-
dorif rule respondeat superior could not
have been applied, the Court held the
Schloendorfl rule inapplicable to a city in-
stitution, thereby extending a line of deci-
sions6 which had made it inapplicable when
state institutions were involved. It is inter-
esting to note the Court's reasoning in
justifying this exception. The Court decided
that when the legislature waived the state's
sovereign immunity by the Court of Claims
Act it intended that the Act should consti-
tute a
'recognition and acknowledgment of a moral
duty demanded by the principles of equity
and justice. It includes only such claims
which appear to the judicial mind and con-
science to be such as the Legislature may
declare to be affected by a moral obligation
and which the State should satisfy. . . . It
admits that in such negligence cases the
sovereign ought to and promises that in fu-
ture it will voluntarily discharge its moral
obligations in the same manner as the citizen
is forced to perform a duty which courts and
the Legislatures have so long held, as to him,
to be a legal liability. It transforms an unen-
forceable moral obligation into an actionable
legal right and applies to the State the rule
respondeat superior. . ... 7
• 2 N.Y.2d 226, 140 N.E.2d 262 (1957).
6 Robison v. New York, 263 App. Div. 240, 32
N.Y.S.2d 388, (4th Dep't 1942), ajJ'd without
opinion, 292 N.Y. 631, 55 N.E.2d 506 (1944);
Liubowsky v. New York, 260 App. Div. 416, 23
N.Y.S.2d 633 (3d Dep't 1940), afl'd without
opinion, 285 N.Y. 701, 34 N.E.2d 385 (1941).
7 2 N.Y.2d at 235-36, 140 N.E.2d at 268.
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The term "moral obligation" has been
most often used by the courts of states
which have not waived their sovereign im-
munity to suit, and which pay private claims
against the state by legislative appropria-
tions. s When such an appropriation is
challenged as an unconstitutional use of
public money for private purposes the court
often holds that, although no legal obliga-
tion exists, there is a moral obligation,
which the state may satisfy.9 It has been
stated that such an obligation arises from
"... a state of facts appealing to a univer-
sal sense of justice and fairness .... "10 The
Supreme Court of the United States has
held that Congress has the power to pay
national debts ". . . based upon consider-
ations of a moral or merely honorary na-
ture, such as are binding on the conscience
or the honor of an individual, although the
debt could obtain no recognition in a cohrt
of law."'" New York has held that "a
moral obligation is a duty assumed in
obedience to the rules of right condut.' 12
The standard to be used in determihing
such obligations rests on common sense
conceptions of. moral duty.' 8
It is generally conceded that uiijiuit dam-
age resulting from a wrongful act or omis-
sion gives rise to a moral obligation to make
SSee, e.g., Munro v. New York, 223 N.Y. 208, 119
N.E. 444 (1918); State ex rel. Bumgarner v. Sims,
139 W. Va. 92, 79 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
9 Cuvillier v. New York, 250 N.Y. 258, 165 N.E.
284 (1929) (per curiam); Farrington v. New
York, 248 N.Y. 112, 161 N.E. 438 (1928); State
ex rel. Bumgarner v. Sims, supra note 8.
10 Hagler v. Small, 307 111. 460, 479, 138 N.E.
849, 856 (1923).
11 United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440
(1896).
12 Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 70, 186 N.E. 203,
206 (1933).
13 See Evans v. Berry, supra note 12.
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reparations. ' 4 However, respondeat superior
at times obligates one who has done no
wrong. When an employer has chosen his
servant carefully, instructed him and
equipped him properly, then it is difficult
to understand how an obligation in con-
science to make reparation for his servant's
negligence attaches to the employer.' 5
That the law recognizes as moral obliga-
tions some which do not bind in conscience",
is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme
Court quoted above, in which the Court
distinguishes between obligations binding
in conscience and those binding in honor.
A concrete example is that of the bankrupt,
who has no obligation in conscience to pay
the debts discharged in bankruptcy, 17 but
whose moral obligation is sufficient consid-
eration to support a subsequent promise to
pay.18
It appears, therefore, that the moral obli-
gation of which the Court speaks in the
Becker case is one founded in custom and
law, which binds in honor, not in conscience.
Public policy dictates that those who have
been injured shall be made whole. Respon-
deat superior has been selected as the most
feasible means of compensating them in
certain situations. It should be recognized
however that it is not necessarily a doctrine
based upon moral obligation of the type
which binds in conscience.
14 See HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN 239 (1949).
15 Where the employer fails to choose, equip, or
instruct his servant carefully and properly, re-
spondeat superior may also apply. In such a case,
the obligation of the employer is a true moral obli-
gation binding in conscience.
16 See POUND, LAW AND MORALS 76-77 (2d ed.
1926).
17 HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN 306 (1949).
18 Eric v. Gumpert, 138 Misc. 278, 245 N.Y.
Supp. 381 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 231
App. Div. 722, 246 N.Y. Supp. 869 (1st Dep't
1930); Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass.
157, 148 N.E. 379 (1925).
New Connecticut Adoption Statute
Private placements for adoption will be
largely eliminated by a recently adopted
Connecticut legislative provision, to take
effect July 1, 1958. In addition, adoptions
by out-of-state parties can no longer be
based upon private arrangements.
The most significant change brought
about by the amendment will be that;
• . . no application for adoption shall be
accepted by the Probate court unless the
child sought to be adopted has been placed
for adoption by the welfare commissioner
... or an agency licensed by said commis-
sioner .... 1
This provision is entirely new and, except
in the case of children being adopted by
close relatives or placed by out-of-state
agencies with the written consent of the
Commissioner, puts adoption placements
completely in the hands of the Commis-
sioner of Welfare or a social agency licensed
by him.
The immediate effect of this change seems
to be that the Commissioner and the agen-
cies will have a veto in the selection of
adopting parents and virtual control over
the institution of adoption suits. If the
Commissioner sets up adequate regulations,
and it seems safe to assume that he will,
minimum standards governing the require-
ments for the selection of adopting parents
may be achieved. He will be able to specify
the religious, social, financial, mental and
physical qualifications of adopting parents
with the broad authority vested in him as
the head of a state agency.
Children will be protected from the dan-
ger of hasty placements and the statute
will end the activity of adoption brokers
since any service they might formerly have
1 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6867, as amended by Pub-
lic Act No. 203, to take effect July 1, 1958.
been able to perform will now be made im-
possible. The placement activities of out-
of-state adoption agencies within the state
will also come under the scrutiny of the
Commissioner, since any of these agencies
seeking to place children for adoption in
Connecticut must first obtain his written
consent.
This amendment necessitated a further
change in the law regarding the forum in
which an appropriate action might be
brought, viz.;
... the application and agreement of adop-
tion shall be filed in the court of Probate for
the district where the adopting parent re-
sides or, in the case of a minor under the
guardianship of the welfare commissioner
or an agency licensed by him, in the district
where the main office or any local office of
the commissioner or such agency is located..2
The effect of this change would seem to
be that every adoption case, discounting the
two types covered by the exception, will
now have to be brought in the court of
probate for the district in which the Com-
missioner or a licensed agency has an of-
fice. This is necessarily so since every child
must be placed for adoption by the Com-
missioner or an agency licensed by him with
the exception of the two types of adoption
already mentioned. Another logical corol-
lary of this would seem to be that out-of-
state parties will not be able to adopt even
close relatives within the state except
through the Commissioner or a licensed
agency since such parties will have no
forum in which to commence a court action.
In 1953, this same approach was adopted
by Delaware, the only other state with this
type of statute.3 In addition, the Delaware
legislation, unlike that of Connecticut, in-
cludes a provision allowing an appeal from
2 Ibid.
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (1953).
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a decision of the Commissioner or an
agency to be taken to the appropriate
orphan's court within ten days of the ac-
tion of the Commissioner or the agency.'
Since Delaware allows only residents to
adopt,; the problem of out-of-state adop-
tions does not exist. The only court author-
ized to entertain an adoption petition is
the orphan's court in the county in which
the petitioner resides.,
It seems that the protection afforded to
the best interests of the child varies directly
with the degree of control exercised by the
state. In addition to the proper use of that
control the substantive aspects of the laws
or regulations to be applied should be
sound and truly conducive to insuring the
best interests of the child. It is hoped the
statute in Connecticut will be supplemented
by adequate substantive regulations. Never-
theless, the statute itself prevents a doctor,
or a lawyer, or even an organization from
collecting children and placing them for
adoption under private auspices with its
attendant irregularity of standards. This
revision should further curtail any illegal
adoption rings operating within and across
the state line.
Further, if this statute is properly imple-
mented by an adequate screening process,
the natural hesitancy of judges to give
speedy judgment in all but the most cer-
tain cases can be overcome. This in turn
will speed up adoption proceedings and
allow more cases to be handled without im-
pairing the quality of adoptions. If this
results in more children being placed in
the healthy, normal atmosphere of good
private homes, an important advance will
have been made in the law of adoption.
4 id. § 905.
Id. § 903.
"Id. § 902.
